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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

Case No. 20010046-SC

VALDENCRAM,

:

Priority No. 13

Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appealed from the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss on double
jeopardy grounds after his trial on second degree felony tax evasion charges ended in a hung
jury. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling. This Court has jurisdiction
pursuant to its grant of certiorari review. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a), (5) (1996).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issue 1: Did defendant invite any error by the trial court in declaring a mistrial where
defendant initially asked for the mistrial and then twice declined the trial court's invitation
to register any objection to the mistrial on the record?
Issue 2: Did the court of appeals correctly conclude that legal necessity justified a
mistrial where the jury announced its inability to reach a verdict, received a deadlock
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instruction, and after continued deliberations again announced that it was unable to reach a
verdict?
Standard of Review: On certiorari, this Court reviews "the decision of the court of
appeals, not the decision of the trial court." In reA.T., 2001 UT 82, f 5,2001 WL 1131921.
Although the court of appeals' decision is reviewed for correctness, "[t]he correctness of the
court of appeals' decision turns on whether that court accurately reviewed the trial court's
decision under the appropriate standard of review." State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, f 9,22 P.3d
1242. A trial court has "broad discretion" in deciding whether or not "manifest necessity"
justifies discharging a hung jury. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497,509 (1978). See also
State v. Ambrose, 598 P.2d 354, 358-60 (Utah 1979); West Valley City v. Patten, 1999 UT
App 149, f 7, 981 P.2d 420,422.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The text of the following applicable constitutional provisions and statutes is
reproduced in Addendum A:
United States Constitution, amendment V;
Utah Constitution, article I, section 12;
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-403 (1999).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
Defendant was charged in an October 24, 1996 information with four counts of tax
evasion, second degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1101(l)(c) (1999)
and § 59-l-40i(9)(c) (1996) (R. 1-2). On the State's motion, one of the counts was
dismissed before trial (R. 49).
2

Defendant moves for a mistrial
A jury trial on the remaining three counts took place on August 17-18,1998 (R. 64043,645-46; R. 846:5-183, R.802:3-237).1 The jury was excused to begin deliberating at 6:47
p.m. on August 18 (R. 646). At 9:09 p.m., the trial court and counsel went back on the
record (R. 646; R. 802:227). The bailiff stated that the jury had indicated they were unable
to reach a decision (R. 802:227). The court proposed giving the jury an Allen charge, that
is, an additional instruction which directed the jury to "consult with each other and to
deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement, if it can be done without abandoning your
individual judgment" (R. 802:227-28; Jury Instruction No. 16, R. 690).2
Defendant, through counsel, immediately moved for a mistrial. Defense counsel
stated that while he had no objection to the body of the Allen instruction, "I do have an
objection as far as the giving of the instruction to the jury and would ask that the Court
declare a hung jury and that there be a mistrial" (R. 802:227-28, Addendum B). The trial
court inquired whether there was a basis for the defendant's objection, "other than [the fact
that] that would be your preference?" (R. 802:228). Defense counsel's response was
initially inaudible on the record, but he then stated, "And just the basis that they had indicated

l

The trial transcript for August 17, 1998 is contained in the record volume number
846. The trial transcript for August 18, 1998 is contained in the record volume numbered
802.
2

"An Allen charge takes its name from Allen v. United States, [164 U.S. 492
(1896)]. In Allen, the United States Supreme Court approved a supplemental instruction
given to a jury that was having difficulty arriving at a unanimous verdict." State v.
Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 861 (Utah 1992).
3

they could not reach a verdict" (R. 802:228). In response, the prosecutor favored giving an
Allen instruction because "[t]wo hours isn't an excessively long time. I think we ought to
encourage them to try one more time here" (R. 802:228).
The trial court instructs the jury to continue deliberating
The trial court agreed with the prosecutor, reasoning that "the jurors have been
deliberating for a few hours
trial. . . .
difference

In my view, the time has not been excessive with a two day

I would like them to consider one other instruction to whether it makes any
So, I think I will have the bailiff bring them in, read this instruction, and give

them some additional time and then see what the result is, if anything" (R. 802:228-29). The
court recalled the jury and read the supplemental instruction. (R. 646; R. 802:229-31). The
trial court then excused the jury for further deliberations (R. 646; R. 802:229-31).
The jury asks the trial court questions
At about 9:50 p.m., approximately 40 to 45 minutes after receiving the Allen charge,
the jury sent two written questions to the court (R. 802:231). The first note read, "On State's
Exhibit No. 3 Utah Code Annotated § 59-10-542 (1953 as amended) we would like to know
what that code says/'3 The court conferred with both counsel on the record and decided to
respond that the reference to the code section on the exhibit was irrelevant and should not
be considered by the jury (R. 802:231).

3

The jurors' notes and the trial court's responses are handwritten on two 4" by 6"
pieces of yellow paper. They are included in the record in an unnumbered brown
envelope containing defendant's exhibits. The two notes are not numbered.
4

The second note read, "If there is proof from the State of Utah that income is taxable
by Utah law, was it shown in court today?" (R. 802:232). The court also discussed this note
with both counsel and decided to respond, "This is a determination for the jury. See
instructions 5 and 6." (Instructions 5 and 6 informed the jury that they were the sole judges
of the evidence and the facts). The court then took another recess (R. 802:234).4
The trial court declares a mistrial after the jury foreperson
states that further deliberations would be futile
At approximately 10:15 p.m., fifteen to twenty minutes after the court responded to
the jury's questions, the bailiff again reported that the jury was unable to reach a unanimous
verdict (R. 646; R. 802:234). The court reconvened with the jury present and engaged the
foreperson in the following discussion:
The Court:

[T]he report I' ve received through the bailiff is that the jury has
been unable to reach a unanimous decision. Is that correct?

Juror Holt:

Yes.

The Court:

All right. Do you think that any additional period of time for
deliberation would make any difference?

defendant's brief reports that while the court and counsel were framing responses
to the jury's questions, the bailiff left and returned a few minutes later with the news that
the jury had no further questions. Br. Aplt. 6. Defendant concedes that exchange was not
transcribed, but asserts that it may be found on the videotape record of the proceedings
below. Id. at 6 n.3. The videotape record of the proceedings is not part of the record on
appeal, nor was it made a part of the record before the court of appeals. It is therefore
improper to cite to this purported exchange and this Court may not consider it. See
Wilderness Building Systems v. Chapman, 699 P.2d 766, 767 (Utah 1985) (appellate
court's review is limited to evidence contained in the record on appeal).
5

Juror Holt:

No.

The Court:

All right. All right. And do you have any question that you
want to ask about that? There have been a couple of notes
passed and some response given, although perhaps not as much
response as you had hoped. Any question or —

Juror Holt:

No. (Inaudible)

The Court:

All right. Are those questions that you have not sent out to me
so far?

Mr. Holt:

Well, yes and no.

The Court:

Yes and no. Okay. All right. I guess I need to make sure I
understand then. If there were a couple of questions answered,
do you think you could reach a verdict or it would be at least
worth deliberating longer or do you think that would just
confirm the positions or decisions that the jurors have reached?

Juror Holt:

Well, speaking for myself, it would probably (inaudible).

The Court:

Okay. All right. Counsel, is there any record that you would
like to make at this point?

Defense Counsel: I don't have anything, your Honor.
Prosecutor: No, your Honor.
The Court:

All right All right. Well, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I'm
not going to require you to stay any longer. I am going to
release you from your duties here and excuse you to go home..
. I'm going to declare that there is a mistrial, that the jury is not
able to reach a verdict, and I'll excuse you . . . . Counsel, is
there anything else for the record this evening?

Defense Counsel: No, your Honor.
(R. 802.234-37; Addendum C).

6

The trial court scheduled a second jury trial to be held in February 1999 (R. 794).
Defendant moved to dismiss, arguing, among other things, that the trial court's declaration
of a mistrial was not supported by "manifest necessity" (R. 810-820). The trial court denied
the motion, ruling: "[Ajccording to U.C.A. 76-1-403 and Utah case law on the issue, the
mistrial declared in this matter on August 18,1998 was not an improper termination of the
prosecution and resulted because the jury was unable to agree upon a verdict. The Court
further finds a proper record was made at the time the mistrial was declared...." (R. 835;
Addendum D).
Court ofAppeals' decision
Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss to the court of appeals. In an
unpublished memorandum decision issued after oral argument, the court of appeals
unanimously affirmed the trial court. State v. Cram, 2000 UTApp 375 (Addendum E). The
court of appeals first held that defendant had waived any claimed error when he failed to
specifically and timely object to the trial court's declaration of a mistrial. Id. at 1-2. The
court of appeals noted that had defendant timely objected, the trial court could have corrected
any claimed error before the jury was discharged. Id. at 2.
The court of appeals further observed that defendant had acknowledged "that he knew
the [trial] court was contemplating a mistrial, but believed he was not obligated to object."
Id. Stating that defendant's belief "was in error," the court of appeal elaborated, "'[A]
defendant should not be permitted to forego making an objection with the strategy of
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enhancing] the defendant's changes of acquittal and then, if that strategy fails,... claiming]
on appeal that the Court should reverse."1 Id. (quoting State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^ 11,
10 P.3d 346) (additional internal quotation marks omitted).
Although the court of appeals ruled defendant's claim unpreserved, it nevertheless
addressed the merits of the claim. The court of appeals held that "legal necessity" justified
termination of the trial based on the jury's inability to reach a verdict. Based on the
following record facts, the court of appeals concluded that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in dismissing the jury when it did: (1) the dialogue between the trial court and jury
foreperson in which the court twice asked if additional time or receiving answers to
additional questions would facilitate a verdict, and the foreperson responded, "no," (2) the
minute entry chronicling the time the jury deliberated, (3) the trial court's supplemental
"deadlock" instruction, and (4) the time spent conferring with counsel. Id. at 3.
The court of appeals rejected defendant's claim that the trial court declared a mistrial
"so abruptly" that he did not have an opportunity to object. Id. It also observed that the trial
court had twice asked defense counsel if he wanted "to go on record in response to the jury's
inability to reach a verdict or inquire of the jury foreperson. Defendant's counsel declined
on both occasions." Id.
This Court granted defendant's timely petition for a writ of certiorari.

8

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I: Defendant invited any alleged error arisingfromthe trial court's declaration
of a mistrial when he first moved for a mistrial and then declined to go on the record in
response to the jury' s inability to reach a verdict. Although the trial court denied defendant's
motion, gave an Allen charge, and over defendant's objection, sent the jury back for further
deliberations, defendant never withdrew his objection or otherwise notified the trial court that
he wished the jury to continue deliberating. When the court specifically invited defendant
to address the jury's second declaration that they were deadlocked, defense counsel merely
stated that he had nothing to say. This failure in conjunction with his earlier motion
constituted invited error and consent to the mistrial.
Point II: The court of appeals properly held that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it determined that the jury was deadlocked and declared a mistrial. A trial
judge's belief that a jury is genuinely deadlocked presents a classic case of legal or manifest
necessity. A trial court has broad discretion in determining whether a jury is truly hung.
The trial court acted well within its discretion in making that determination here.
When the jury informed the court that it was deadlocked, the trial court gave the jury an Allen
charge and asked it to continue deliberations. The court answered the jury's questions and
when the jury again reported that it could not reach a verdict, the court carefully inquired of
the foreman whether additional information or time would assist the jury to arrive at a
decision. It was only after the foreman repeatedly assured the court that the deadlock could
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not be resolved and the court sought the input of both counsel that it relented and declared
the mistrial
ARGUMENT
POINT I
BECAUSE DEFENDANT INVITED THE ALLEGED ERROR HE NOW
CLAIMS ON APPEAL, THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY
HELD THAT HE IS NOT ENTITLED TO APPELLATE REVIEW
Defendant first argues that the court of appeals improperly held that his failure to
timely object below barred appellate review of his claim that the jury was prematurely
discharged. Br. Aplt. 9-10. Defendant contends that "[i]n sum and substance, the [cjourt of
[a]ppeals concluded that in failing to make a contemporaneous objection, [defendant]
consented to the mistrial and could not effectively raise the issue thereafter in the trial court
or on appeal." Br. Aplt. 10 (emphasis in original). Defendant claims that by framing the
issue as one of preservation, "the court of appeals avoided addressing the real issue, namely,
whether the defendant consented to the mistrial." Br. Aplt. 10. Defendant asserts that under
controlling caselaw his "mere silence" did not amount to his consent to the mistrial. Br. Aplt.
10-18. He also renews his claim that the trial court so abruptly declared the mistrial that he
did not have an opportunity to object. Br. Aplt. 17.
Contrary to defendant's claims, the court of appeals correctly concluded that
defendant was not entitled to appellate review because, notwithstanding his claims of "mere
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silence," defendant invited the very "error" that he now attacks on appeal.5 As the court of
appeals also recognized, the record belies defendant's claim that the trial court's declaration
of a mistrial unfairly surprised him. See Cram, at 3.
A.

Defendant invited the error he complains of by moving for a mistrial and, then
despite the invitation to do so, by not objecting when the court declared one.
This Court has "held repeatedly that on appeal, a party cannot take advantage of an

error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing error." State v.
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993). This rule, known as the "invited error" doctrine,
has two principal purposes: (1) "it fortifies . . . long-established policy that the trial court
should have the first opportunity to address the claim of error," and (2) "it discourages parties
from intentionally misleading the trial court so as to preserve a hidden ground for reversal
on appeal." Id. at 1220 (citations omitted). Thus, while a party may sometimes obtain "plain
error" review of an unpreserved claim, no review is available when a party "invites" or leads
the trial court into committing the alleged error. State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 553 n.20,
560-561 (Utah 1987) (notwithstanding plain error exception to preservation rule, invited
error viewed with disfavor and will operate to waive claim on appeal); Parsons v. Barnes,
871 P.2d 516, 519 (Utah 1994) (declining to review issue where error complained of
"smack[ed] of invited error"); State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021,1023 (Utah 1987) (declining

Although the court of appeals appears to have treated the issue primarily as one of
simple waiver, it also implicitly recognized that defendant invited any error by
consciously deciding not to object. Cram, at 2.
11

to review defendant's claim that giving Allen charge was error where counsel stated on
record that she had read the instruction and had no objection to it); see also State v. Bullock,
791 P.2d 155, 158 (Utah 1989) (court will not conduct plain error review if trial counsel's
actions amounted to active rather than passive waiver of objection).
Defendant's conduct presents a classic case of invited error. First, defendant invited
the trial court to discharge the jury when the jury first notified the court that it was
deadlocked. Defendant objected to giving the jury any further instructions and asked the trial
court to simply declare a mistrial and discharge the jury (R. 802:227-28). In short, defendant
objected to further deliberations by the jury.
Although the trial court denied the motion, gave an Allen charge, and, over
defendant's objection, sent the jury back for further deliberations, defendant never withdrew
his objection or otherwise notified the trial court that he wished the jury to continue
deliberations (R. 802:227-29,231-37). Indeed, when the jury informed the court a second
time that it was deadlocked, the trial court specifically invited the input of both defense
counsel and the prosecutor (R. 802:234-37). Instead of informing the trial court that he now
wished the jury to continue deliberations, defense counsel merely stated that he had nothing
to say (R. 802:234-37). Defendant's studied silence at this juncture could be read only as a
reaffirmation of his prior objection to continued deliberations by the jury. That in turn could
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only suggest to the trial court that defendant was in fact consenting to the discharge of the
jury.6
B.

Defendant's conduct did not constitute "mere silence/' but was an active decision
not to object and constituted consent to discharging the jury.
Relying on this Court's decision in State v. Ambrose, 598 P.2d 354 (Utah 1979) and

the court of appeals' decision in State v. Nilson, 854 P.2d 1029 (Utah App. 1993), defendant
nevertheless asserts that "mere silence or failure to object to the jury's discharge is not such
consent as will constitute waiver of a former jeopardy plea." Br. Aplt. 10. Even accepting
that general proposition as true, defendant cannot reasonably characterize his statement, "I
don't have anything, your Honor," as "mere silence" or as a simple "failure to object." This
is particularly true where defendant had already told the court that he did object to continued
jury deliberations.
Defendant's reliance on Ambrose and Nilson is misplaced.

The jury in

Ambrose deliberated for approximately one hour and fifteen minutes before informing the
court that the jurors were "having difficulty reaching a verdict." Ambrose, 598 P.2d at 356.
After confirming that the jurors believed that further deliberations would be futile, the trial

6

Defendant suggests that the trial court specifically found that he did not consent.
Br. Aplt. 11-12. The record does not support that suggestion. Although both parties
argued the consent issue to the trial court, the trial court's order denying defendant's
motion to dismiss is silent on the point and states only that the trial court believed that
legal necessity justified the mistrial because the jury was unable to agree upon a verdict
(R. 810-20, 824-30, 835). The fact that the trial court did not expressly find that
defendant consented does not mean that the trial court found, or even believed, that
defendant had not consented.
13

court asked the prosecutor for his input. Id. at 356. The prosecutor replied in front of the
jury that it cost "about eight hundred dollars a day to run this court," and that "considering
the costs involved, the expense, inconvenience to everybody," the jury should be urged to
"arrive at a verdict or to exercise every conceivable effort to do so" before declaring a
mistrial. Id. The trial court then interrupted and asked defense counsel if he considered the
prosecutor's comments to be error. Id. Defense counsel responded, "yes," and the trial court
immediately and without warning declared a mistrial. Id. at 356-57.
On appeal, the State claimed the mistrial was justified because "the jury was
hopelessly deadlocked." Id. at 358. This Court held, however, that the record suggested that
the basis for the mistrial was not that the jury was deadlocked, but that the trial court
considered the prosecutor's comments to be unfairly prejudicial to the defendant. Id. After
holding that the trial court should have consulted defense counsel before discharging the jury,
the Court rejected the State's argument that the defendant's failure to object implied that he
consented to the mistrial and waived his double jeopardy claim. Id. at 359-60. The Court
instead held that "mere silence in this situation can [not] be equated to waiver of such an
important constitutional right." Id. at 360.
Because Ambrose was never given an opportunity to object, his failure to do so did
constitute "mere silence." In contrast, defendant here not only had an opportunity to object,
but he affirmatively declined to do so even when invited to make a record by the trial court
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(R. 802:234-37). That affirmative failure, coupled with his prior motion for mistrial,
bespeaks much more than "mere silence" or even acquiescence.
Nilson likewise rebuts defendant's claim of "mere silence." In Nilson, the prosecutor
moved mid-trial to dismiss the information after the victim materially changed the time frame
of the alleged offense and the trial court denied the prosecutor's motion to amend the
information. Nilson, 854 P.2d at 1030. The prosecutor acknowledged on the record that the
victim's change of testimony made it impossible for the State to prove its case and that under
the circumstances the trial court would be obligated to sustain a motion for a directed verdict
by the defense. Id. The prosecutor stated his intent to refile a new information alleging the
correct dates. Id.
After the trial court agreed that it would have no choice but to grant a motion for
directed verdict, Nilson's attorney stated that she had no objection to "the motion to dismiss."
Id. Defense counsel said nothing about agreeing to the charges being refiled and, in fact,
after the jury had been excused, stated on the record that she believed that double jeopardy
would bar a second trial. Id.
The court of appeals held that Nilson did not consent to the refiling of charges by
stating that he did not object to the dismissal of the charges. Id. at 1031-32. The court of
appeals noted that it "quickly became apparent, particularly after the trial court denied the
State's motion to amend the information that proceeding further would result in acquittal."
Id. at 1032. Thus, the court of appeals held that when the State moved to dismiss "to
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expedite the inevitable, Nilson had no obligation to warn that double jeopardy might bar a
subsequent prosecution." Id.
Unlike defendant, Nilson did not affirmatively move the court for a mistrial. Rather,
Nilson merely agreed to a dismissal of the charges against him. That circumstance can
hardly be equated to this situation, where defendant moved for a mistrial and then, when
given the opportunity, affirmatively declined to withdraw his objection to further
deliberations by the jury.
To avoid the consequences of his invited error, defendant baldly asserts that it should
have been obvious to the trial court that he was no longer interested in discharging the jury
after they sent their second note to the court. Br. Aplt. 6, 17. The second note asked, "If
there is prooffromthe State of Utah, that income is taxable, By law, Utah law. Was it shown
in court Today[?]" (R. 850, Court's Ex. No. 2). Defendant claims this question "signaled a
potential problem for the prosecution," thereby making it apparent that he no longer wanted
a mistrial. Br. Aplt. 6,17.
Defendant does not explain why this note obviously conveyed a new disinterest in a
mistrial. The note merely suggested that at least one juror was laboring under the erroneous
belief that income might not be taxable under Utah law. It certainly did not suggest that the
basis of defendant's motion for mistrial had been obviated or that the jury was likely to reach
a verdict anytime soon. To the contrary, the question reflected the jury's continued,
intractably divided state, thereby suggesting that a unanimous verdict on the question of
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defendant's personal tax liability was unlikely. Even if the note gave rise to the inference
defendant suggests, that inference would have been dispelled as soon as defendant told the
trial court he had nothing to say about the jury's continued deadlock.
Defendant further seeks to evade responsibility for his consent to the mistrial by
arguing that his earlier motion could not have constituted consent because it had been
disposed of and he did not renewed it. Br. Aplt. 13-17. The State, however, does not claim
that defendant's earlier motion, standing alone, amounted to invited error or consent to the
mistrial.

Rather, the State contends only that having made the motion, defendant

affirmatively informed the trial court that he objected to continued deliberations by the jury.
When the jury continued to deadlock, the trial court had no way of knowing that defendant
no longer objected to continued deliberations unless defendant alerted the court to that fact.
Thus, by declining to comment on the jury's inability to reach a verdict, defendant in effect
led the trial court to believe not only that he had no objection to the court's discharging the
jury, but also that he wanted or consented to the discharge.
Defendant's reliance on foreign authority does not help him.

As defendant

acknowledges, in the cases he cites, the accused had either affirmatively withdrawn the
earlier motion, see, e.g., Jones v. Commonwealth, 397 Mass. 607,613,400 N.E.2d 242,246
(1980), or the trial court had declared a mistrial without warning and on different grounds
than those asserted by the accused, see, e.g., United States ex rel. Russo v. Superior Court,
483 F.2d 7, 10-11 (3d Cir.), cert, denied 414 U.S. 1023 (1973); Lovinger v. Circuit Court,
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845 F.2d 739, 743-44 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 488 U.S. 851 (1988). Here, defendant never
informed the trial court that he wished to withdraw his original motion or had changed his
mind about wanting a mistrial. Moreover, the trial court in this case declared the mistrial on
the same grounds asserted by defendant: a deadlocked jury.
C.

Defendant's claim that he was surprised by the trial court's declaration of a
mistrial is belied by the record.
Defendant asserts that he was surprised by the trial court's intention to declare a

mistrial and therefore had no real opportunity to let the court know he objected. Br. Aplt. 17.
Defendant's claim is not credible in light of the record. After the bailiff reported a second
time that the jury could not reach a unanimous decision, the trial court reconvened with the
jury and both counsel on the record (R. 802:234). In response to the trial court's inquiry, the
foreman confirmed that the bailiffs report was true (R. 802:234).7 The trial court then asked
if additional time would "make any difference" (R. 802:234). The foreman replied, "No" (R.
802:234). The court then asked whether the jury had other questions which, if answered,
would help the jury reach a decision (R. 802:234-35). The foreman informed the court that
he did not think it would help (R. 802:235).8

defendant seems to suggest that the court sua sponte decided to bring the jury
back to the courtroom. Br. Aplt. 6, 16-17, 19-20. The court, however, specifically told
the jury that the bailiff had reported that they were unable to reach a verdict and then
asked if that were true (R. 802:234). This statement makes clear that the court
reconvened as a result of being informed that the jury was still deadlocked.
8

Although the foreman's response to this questions was partially inaudible, it is
clear from the context of the entire exchange that he did not believe further deliberations
would be helpful (R. 802:234-37). Otherwise, the court would not have declared a
mistrial, but would have asked the jury to continue deliberating.
18

It was apparent from the foregoing questions and answers that the trial court was
contemplating a mistrial. Thus, when the trial court asked counsel at the end of this
exchange if there was "any record you would like to make at this point," there could have
been no doubt that the court was asking if counsel had any objections to the course it was
clearly planning to take. In view of defendant's earlier objection, the Allen charge, and the
jury's reaffirmation that it was unable to reach a verdict, defendant cannot reasonably claim
that he was surprised by the trial court's grant of a mistrial or that he still did not have the
opportunity to object. That he purposefully chose not to object is supported by the fact that
he did not do so when, after the jury was excused, the trial court asked a second time if
defendant had anything else he wanted to say on the record (R. 802:237).
In sum, defendant invited any error that he now alleges. That invited error was
tantamount to consent to the mistrial. Defendant, therefore, is not entitled to appellate review
of his claim.
POINT II
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THE
TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
DISCHARGING THE JURY WHERE THE JURY INDICATED IT
COULD NOT REACH A VERDICT, WHERE THE TRIAL COURT
GAVE AN ALLEN CHARGE, AND WHERE DESPITE CONTINUED
DELIBERATIONS THE JURY AGAIN REPORTED THAT IT WAS
DEADLOCKED
Defendant argues that the court of appeals also erred in holding that "legal necessity"
justified declaring a mistrial. Br. Aplt. 18-26. This Court need not reach this issue unless
it determines that defendant did not invite the alleged error or did not either expressly or
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implicitly consent to the mistrial. Should this Court determine that defendant did not invite
any error, the court of appeals correctly held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in declaring a mistrial.
A.

A genuinely deadlocked jury constitutes legal or manifest necessity.
"Utah law . . . establishes that discharge of the jury without a verdict operates as an

acquittal, unless: (1) the defendant consents to the discharge, or (2) "legal necessity" requires
the discharge in the interest of justice." State v. Ambrose, 598 P.2d 354, 358 (Utah 1979).
See also Arizona v. Washington, 343 U.S. at 505 ("manifest necessity" must be shown for
any mistrial declared over defendant's objection).9 A trial judge's belief that the jury is
"genuinely deadlocked" presents "a classic basis for a proper mistrial." Id. at 509. Accord
Ambrose, 598 P.2d at 358 n.9; State v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1061, 1065 (Utah 1983). In
other words, a jury unable to agree on a verdict constitutes "legal necessity." See Utah Code
Ann. § 76-1-403 (1999) (providing that double jeopardy does not bar a retrial where "the
court finds and states for the record that termination is necessary because . . . [t]he jury is
unable to agree upon a verdict).
B.

A trial court has broad discretion in determining whether a jury is truly
deadlocked.
The broadest discretion is afforded trial judges "in deciding whether or not 'manifest

necessity' justifies a discharge of the jury." Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. at 509. "[T]he
rationale for this deference in the 'hung' jury situation is that the trial court is in the best
9

In Ambrose, the Utah Supreme Court equated the term "legal necessity" with
"manifest necessity." Ambrose, 598 P.2d at 358.
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position to assess all the factors which must be considered in making a necessarily
discretionary determination whether the jury will be able to reach a just verdict if it continues
to deliberate." Id. at 509 n.28. "If retrial of the defendant were barred whenever an appellate
court views the 'necessity' for a mistrial differently from the trial judge, there would be a
danger that the latter, cognizant of the serious societal consequences of an erroneous ruling,
would employ coercive means to break the apparent deadlock. Such a rule would frustrate
the public interest in just judgments." Id. at 509-10.
Accordingly, the court of appeals would have been justified in reversing the trial
court's determination that the jury was unable to reach a verdict only "[i]f the record
reveal[ed] that the trial judge ha[d] failed to exercise the' sound discretion' entrusted to him."
Id. at 509 n.28.
C.

The court of appeals correctly determined that the trial court acted well within
its discretion in determining that the jury was deadlocked.
The court of appeals correctly determined that on this record the trial court clearly did

not abuse its discretion in declaring a hung jury. To the contrary, the record demonstrates
that the trial court "scrupulously" exercised its discretion. See Ambrose, 598 P.2d at 356-57;
West Valley City v. Patten, 1999 UT App 149, f 11, 981 P.2d 420.
First, when informed of the deadlock, the trial court read the jury an Allen instruction,
reminding them of their function and encouraging them to listen earnestly to their fellow
jurors and deliberate with open minds. When the jury's disagreement persisted, the trial
court thoughtfully entertained questions from the jury, formulating answers with the
assistance of both counsel. When the jury still could not reach a verdict, the court pointedly
21

inquired whether the jury had further questions which, if answered, would help them arrive
at a decision. The trial court relented only when the jury foreperson repeatedly assured it that
the problem could not be resolved with either additional information or time.
Second, the trial court entered an explicit finding on the record that the jury was
unable to reach a verdict (R. 802:236). That finding was not clearly erroneous given the
jury's repeated stated inability to reach a verdict despite an Allen charge and despite
receiving answers to their questions.
Finally, the trial court's declaration of a mistrial was not abrupt nor premature under
the circumstances. The jury had been deliberating for approximately an hour after the trial
court had given them the Allen charge (R. 646). As stated in Point I.D, supra, the trial court
carefully established on the record that the jury was unable to reach a verdict before turning
to defense counsel and soliciting his comments. It was only after defendant stated he had
nothing to say that the trial court declared the mistrial. Clearly, defendant was not caught off
guard by the trial court's action.
Defendant suggests that the trial court's discharge of the jury was precipitous because
the jury had only had thirteen minutes to consider the written responses to its questions. Br.
Aplt. 19-20. Defendant asserts that this was "scarcely" enough time for the jury "to review,
let alone consider and implement, the court's responses to its handwritten notes." Id. at 20.
The record does not support that conclusion. Far from acting precipitously, the trial court
called the jury in only in response to the bailiffs report that the jury could not reach a
decision (R. 802:234). That second report came after the court had sent its written responses
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to the jury (R. 802:232-34).

The only reasonable inference to be drawn under the

circumstances is that the jury had reviewed the court's answers, but did not believe they
would assist the jury in reaching a consensus. Indeed, during the court's inquiry, the foreman
stated that further answers would not help the jury break its impasse (R. 802:234-37).
Defendant also implies that "in light of the length of the trial and the volume and
complexity of the evidence," the jury had not deliberated long enough when the trial court
excused them. Br. Aplt. 21-23. However, he does not attempt to calculate any minimum
length of time the jury should have deliberated. In any event, this was not a lengthy or
complex case. Only four witnesses - a Utah Tax Commission investigator, defendant's
former employer, a tax return preparer, and defendant - testified (R. 846:19, 118, 129; R.
802:92). The jury received only 15 instructions in addition to the Allen charge (R. 668-88).
Although the trial took two days, much of that time was spent injury selection and argument
of motions outside the jury's presence. Presentation of evidence, argument, and jury
instruction took only between 8 to 9 hours (see R. 642-43, 645; R. 802:89-90).10
After hearing what was essentially a nine-hour trial, the jury deliberated more than
three hours (R. 646). Because the issues were few and the amount of evidence before the
jury relatively small, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the amount
of time spent in deliberations was sufficient to conclude that the jury could not agree. See,
e.g. People v. Price, 821 P.2d 610, 695 (Cal. 1991) ("Whether the jury has had sufficient

l0

On the first day of trial, the jury did not hear any evidence until 1:51 p.m. and
was excused at 4:27 p.m. (R. 642-43). On the second day, the jury did not hear any
evidence until 1:15 p.m. (R. 802:89-90).
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time to deliberate, and whether there is no reasonable probability of a verdict are
determinations committed to the sound discretion of the trial court."), cert, denied, 506 U.S.
851 (1992); Jones v. State, 540 N.E.2d 1228,1229 (Ind. 1989) (trial court has discretion to
determine whether declaration of a mistrial is appropriate in hung jury situation).
Defendant further complains that the jury apparently did not fully understand its
responsibility to honestly try to reach a decision. Br. Aplt. 21-22. He charges that a trial
court "confronted with premature protestations of deadlock, has a duty to educate that jury
and to charge it anew." Id. This claim amounts to a complaint that the trial court was
obligated to give the jury an Allen charge and encourage it to continue deliberating. The trial
court in fact did educate the jury when, over defendant's objection, it gave them the Allen
charge that he now claims was so essential.
D.

The trial court could reasonably rely on the jury foreperson's representations
in determining that the jury was deadlocked.
Defendant argues that the court's "cursory" inquiry of the jury foreman was

inadequate to satisfy the manifest necessity standard. Br. Aplt. 23-25. He suggests that the
court should have sua sponte questioned the jurors individually to verify that the jury was
truly deadlocked. Id.
Utah law has never imposed a requirement that each juror must be questioned
individually before a trial court can declare a mistrial. Since the trial court occupies an
advantaged position to determine whether a mistrial is proper, such a requirement is neither
necessary nor desirable. See State v. Castle, 951 P.2d 1109, 1113 (Utah App. 1998)
(appellate court defers to trial court's decision to declare mistrial because '[w]e are wholly
24

unable to glean from the typewritten record 'body language' factors that may have weighed
heavily in the judge's decision . . . which can only be observed by one person in the
courtroom"). It may very well be that the trial court saw no need to individually question the
jurors because they nodded or otherwise showed assent when the foreperson represented that
they were hopelessly deadlocked.
Under the circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in relying on the
foreman's representations that the jury was unable to reach a verdict. See State v. Dykstra,
656 P.2d 1137, 1140 (Wash. App.) (while polling of individual jurors is not necessarily
precluded, "the court has the discretion to rely on the representations of the foreman"),
review denied, 99 Wash. 2d 1014 (Wash. 1983).
In sum, defendant simply has not shown that the court of appeals was incorrect in
holding the trial court in this case did not abuse its discretion when it declared a mistrial.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm the court
of appeals.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A
Constitutional Provisions and Statutes

CONSTITUTION or THI UNITE) JTATII

AMENDMENT V
^Criminal actions—Provisions concerning — Due process
of law and just compensation clauses.]
No ptrtoa ahall bo hold to u m r for a capital, or otherwise infamous
erime, unless oa • presentment or iadietmoat oft Grand Jury, except ia eaaot
•ruing ia tho land or naval forces, or ia tho Militia whoa ia actual aorvieo ia
time of War or public daagor, aor shall any person bo subject for tho I U M
off«ncotob«twic«putinjoop4rdyoflif(iorliinb;nor«haUUcomp«l]»diaany
criminal eaao to bo a witaoai agaiaat himself, aor t» doprivod of life, liberty,
or property, without duo oncost of law, aor ahall private property bo takoa for
public use, without Juat componsatioa.

Art I, I IS

coNtmvnoK or UTAH

Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
Ia criminal prosecutions tho accused ahall have the right to appear and
iefend ia peraoa aad by counsel, to demand tho nature aad cause of the
•ccusatioa agaiaat him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in hia owa behalf, to
be confronted by the witnesses agaiaat him, to have compulsory process to
Eorapel the attendance of witnesses ia his owa behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which tho offense ia
illeged to have beta committed, aad tho right to afpoal ia all cases. Ia no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, bo compelled to
idvaace money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. Tie accused
ihall not bo compelled to give evidence agaiaat himselfi a wife shall not bo
aomueUad to tettifV against her husband, aor a husband against hia wife, aor
shall any person be twice put ia Jeopardy for tho tame offer

UTAH CRIMINAL CODI

76-1-403. Former proaecution birring subsequent prosecution for offense out of same epitode*
(1) If s dtftndtnt htt bttn prottcuted for ont or mors offtnsts arisinf out
of t singlt criminal tpitodt, t substqutnt prottcution for tht saint or a
difftrtnt offtntt trising out of tht stmt criminal tpitodt it barrtd if
(a) Tht subttqutnt prottcution itfartn offtntt that wat or should hart
bttn tritd undtr Subttction 76-1-402(2) in thtfarmerprottcution; and
(b) Tht fonntr prottcution:
(i) rttulttd in acquittal; or
(ii) rttulttd in conviction; or
(iii) was improperlyterminated;or
(iv) was ttnninattd by t final ordtr or judgmtnt for tht dtftndtnt
that has not bttn rtvtrstd, stt tsidtf or vtcattd and that ntctssarily
rtquirtd t dtttrminttion inconsistent with a fact that must be
esttblishtd to stcurt conviction in tht substqutnt prottcution.
(2) Thtrt is tn acquittal if tht prottcution rttulttd in tfindingof not guilty
by tht trior of (acts or in a dtttrminttion that thtrt was intuffidtnt tvidtnct
to warrant conviction. Afindingof guilty of a lttttr indudtd offtntt is an
acquittal of tht grttttr offtntt tvtn though tht conviction for tht lttttr
indudtd offtntt it oubttqutntly rtvtrstdf stt tsidt, or vtctttd.
(3) Thtrt it t conviction if tht prottcution rttulttd in t judgmtnt of guilt
that hat not bttn rtvtrstd, stt tsidt, or vtctttd; t vtrdict of guilty that hat not
bttn rtvtrstdt stt ttidt, or vtctttd and that it ctptblt of supporting a
judgmtnt; or t pita of guilty acctpttd by the court
(4) Tlitrt it tnimproptrttiminttion of prottcution
.
pi set btfort tht vtrdict, it for rtttont not amounting to tn acquittal, and taktt
pltct tfttr t jury hat bttn imptntlltd and sworn to try tht dtftndtnt, or, if tht
jury trial it wtivtd, tfttr tht first witnttt is sworn. Howtvtr, ttrminttion of
prottcution it not improptr i£
(t) Tht dtftndtnt conttntt to thttermination;or
(b) Tht dtftndtnt waivtt hitrightto otytct to tht ttrminttion;
(c) Tht court findt and ttattt far the rtcord thtt tht ttrminttion it
ntcttttry btcauac
(i) It it physically impottiUt to procttd with tht trial in conformity
with tht law; or
(ii) Thtrtisskgaldtftctinthtprocttdinanottttributeblttotht
state that would makt tny judgmtnt tnterta upon t vtrdict rtvtrtiblt tt t matter of law; or
(iii) Prejudicial conduct la or out of tht courtroom not sttributablt
to tht tttte maktt it impossiblt to procttd with tht trial without
injustict to tht dtftndtnt or tht state; or
(iv) Tht jury it unablt to agrat upon t vtrdict; or
(v) Ftltt statemtntt of a juror on voir dirt prtvtnt t fair trial.

ADDENDUM B
Partial Transcript of Defendant's Motion for Mistrial
(R. 802:227-30)

1

Counsel, if you will make sure that you can be contacted

2

by telephone if you're not here in the courthouse. Just let the clerk

3

know what number to use to call you.

4
5

We'll then recess and return when the jury is finished
deliberating. Anything? Any questions?

6

MR. PRISBREY: No.

7

THE COURT: Okay. The Court is in recess.

8
9

(Court recess).
THE COURT: The Court is back on the record now to

10

speak to counsel concerning the report from the bailiff that the jurors

11

have asked about - 1 guess its best to say what happens if they don't

12

reach agreement or - maybe I'd better just let you report exactly what

13

was said to you because I'm not paraphrasing it well.

14

THE BAILIFF: The jury indicated they were unable to

15

reach a decision. They were instructed just to stand by and the Court

16

will be consulted. (Inaudible).

17

THE COURT: All right Thank you. I have discussed

18

with counsel an additional instruction that I have in my standard set but

19

t don't give routinely because its an instruction that has to do with a

20

jury thats having difficulty reaching a verdict

21

Counsel have seen the instruction. Do you want to make

22

any comments regarding that instruction and the suggestion that it be

23

given to the jury to see if they can reach a verdict?

24
25

MR. PRISBREY: No. I don't have any objection to the
body of the instruction. In chambers, we discussed the case that that

1

was based on. But I do have an objection as far as the giving of the

2

instruction to the jury and would ask that the Court declare a hung jury

3

and that there be a mistrial.

4
5
6

THE COURT: Okay. Any particular basis other than that?
That would be your preference?
(No verbal response on tape).

7

THE COURT: Knowing, of course, the time is a little bit

8

after 9:00, the jurors have been deliberating for a few hours. Not long, I

9

supposed, by some standards. Perhaps long by other standards. I

10
11
12
13
14
15

don't know.
MR. PRISBREY: And just the basis that they had
indicated they could not reach a verdict
THE COURT: Okay. All right Mr. Meyers, do you have
any comment?
MR. MEYERS: The State favors giving them the

16

instruction. Two hours isn't an excessively long time. I think we ought

17

to encourage them to try one more time here.

18

THE COURT: Okay. In my view, the time has not been

19

excessive with a two-day trial. The instruction is fairly routine coming

20

from ABA standards reported in the Utah case law.

21

I would like to at least see if this makes any difference, my

22

reading the instruction. But I don't intend to have the jurors locked up

23

or try to force them to reach a verdict if they're not able to do that.

24

I would like them to consider one other instruction to see

25

whether it makes any difference. Of course, none of us have any idea

1

what the deadlock, if there is one, is about.

2

So, I think I will have the bailiff bring them in, read this

3

instruction, and give them some additional time and then see what the

4

result is, if anything.

5

Would you bring the jurors in, please?

6

MR. PRISBREY: We don't have copies of that.

7

THE COURT: I had the copies for you in there. I only

8

have left the ones I was going to give to the jury. Would you like one of

9

these?

10

MR. PRISBREY: Sure.

11

THE COURT: You can go ahead and take that.

12

MR. PRISBREY: May I approach?

13

THE COURT: Allrisefor the jury.

14

(In presence of jury).

15
16

THE COURT: Please, be seated. The record will now
reflect the members of the jury have returned to the courtroom.

17

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, the bailiff has reported

18

that you have reported to him at this point being unable to reach a

19

verdict I don't intend to force you to go on for any unreasonable length

20

of time.

21

I would like to give you one additional instruction and give

22

you some additional time to consider this instruction and deliberate

23

further. This is one that I have reviewed with the attorneys and they

24

are aware of the instruction and its contents and its purpose. Let me

25

read this to you and then I'm going to ask you to return to the jury room

1

for some short period of time to consider this and deliberate further

2

This will be instruction No. 16.

3

You have previously been instructed that in order to return

4

a verdict, each juror must agree to the same verdict. You have the duty

5

to consult with each other and to deliberate with a view to reaching an

6

agreement if it can be done without abandoning your individual

7

judgment.

8
9
10

Each juror must decide the case for himself or herself but
only after an impartial consideration of the evidence with the other
jurors.

11

You should deliberate together in an atmosphere of

12

mutual difference and respect, giving due consideration to the views of

13

the others.

14

In the course of deliberations, you should not hesitate to

15

re-examine your own views and change your opinion if you are

16

convinced that it is erroneous. On the other hand, you should not

17

surrender your honest convictions as to the weight or effect of the

18

evidence solely because of the opinions of other jurors or for the sole

19

purpose of reaching a verdict

20

I'll initial that instruction. It will be provided to you. There

21

will be a couple of copies of that that you can pass around and

22

consider. And I'll ask you now to return to the jury room with the bailiff

23

and deliberate further to see whether a verdict can be reached on the

24

case.

25

All rise for the jury.

ADDENDUM C
Partial Transcript of Court's Colloquy with Jury Foreman
(R. 802:234-37)

1

MR. MEYERS: "Please, see instructions 5 and 6."

2

MR. PRISBREY: Yeah.

3

THE COURT: Okay. Do you want to see those before

4

they go back in?

5

MR. MEYERS: No.

6

THE COURT: All right. We'll stop the record at this point

7

and continue.

8

(Court recess).

9

THE COURT: We're again back on the record. The

10

members of the jury are returned to the courtroom. The parties are

11

present The attorneys are present

12
13
14

Let me ask first of all who was selected as the
chairperson of the jury?
(No verbal response on tape).

15

THE COURT: Mr. Holt?

16

JUROR HOLT: Yes.

17

THE COURT: All right And the report I've received

18

through the bailiff is that the jury has been unable to reach a unanimous

19

decision. Is that correct?

20

JUROR HOLT: Yes.

21

THE COURT: All right Do you think that any additional

22

period of time for deliberation would make any difference?

23

JUROR HOLT: No.

24

THE COURT: All right All right And do you have any

25

question that you want to ask about that? There have been a couple of

1

notes passed and some response given, although perhaps not as much

2

response as you had hoped. Any question or -

3

JUROR HOLT: No. (Inaudible).

4

THE COURT: All right. Are those questions that you

5

have not sent out to me so far?

6

JUROR HOLT: Weil, yes and no.

7

THE COURT: Yes and no. Okay. All right. I guess I

8

need to make sure I understand then. If there were a couple of

9

questions answered, do you think you could reach a verdict or it would

10

be at least worth deliberating longer or do you think that would just

11

confirm the positions or decisions that the jurors have reached?

12

JUROR HOLT: Well, speaking for myself, it would

13

probably (inaudible).

14

THE COURT: Okay. Ail right

15

Counsel, is there any record that you would like to make

16

at this point?

17

MR. PRISBREY: I don't have anything, your Honor.

18

MR MEYERS: No, your Honor.

19

THE COURT: All right All right

20

Well, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I'm not going to

21

require you to stay any longer. I am going to release you from your

22

duties here and excuse you to go home.

23

You have been diligent in your efforts and the parties and

24

I appreciate your efforts and your diligence and your commitment to

25

doing this type of duty.

1

This service is certainly not compensated for by the small

2

amount that you're paid. I suppose the only thing I can tell you about

3

that is if s a whole lot better now than it was before the first of July

4

when the statute changed. But it still, I know, doesn't compensate for

5

the disruption of your lives and the work that you're called upon to

6

perform.

7

But I'm going to declare that there is a mistrial, that the

8

jury is not able to reach a verdict, and I'll excuse you and release you

9

from your admonition. That will mean that you are now free to discuss

10

the case with anyone that you want to talk to about the case.

11

There may be people who are very interested in speaking

12

to you. And if you want to discuss the case and your deliberations, feel

13

free to do that If you don't want to discuss it, you're also free to make

14

that decision and just inform anyone who wants to talk to you that you'd

15

rather not talk about it

16

I've never had it happen, but I still always try to make the

17

offer to members of a jury that if you have difficulty avoiding someone in

18

particular who just insists on trying to talk to you and you don't want to

19

talk about your service here, feel free to call the courthouse and talk to

20

me about it and I'll see rf there's anything that ought to be done. Again,

21

that's never happened. So, I don't expect it will. But I'd like to at least

22

make that offer in the unlikely event that you had some difficulty with

23

that

24

In addition, if there are any questions you'd like to ask me

25

or ask the attorneys after the Court adjourns here, I'd be happy to meet

1

with you in the jury room in about two minutes. You can speak to the

2

attorneys anytime you want to. If you don't want to wait or if you don't

3

have any questions, that certainly is understandable. Thaf s entirely up

4

to you.

5
6

But thank you again for your participation and your effort
and your service in this regard. You are all now excused.

7
8
9
10

11
12
13

IS
16
17
18
19

21
22
23
24
25

Counsel, is there anything else for the record this
evening?
MR. PRISBREY: No, your Honor.
THE COURT: All right Then the Court will stand

adjourned until tomorrow.
oOo
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

ORDER

VALDEN CRAM,

CASE NO. 961501097

Defendant,

JUDGE G. RAND BEACHAM

On Monday, February 191999, a hearing was held before the Honorable Judge G. Rand
Beacham on the above captioned case regarding Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Defendant was
present and represented by counsel Aaron J. Prisbey. Assistant Attorney General Wade S.
Winegar represented the State. After hearing argumentfromboth counsel, the Court makes the
following findings and order

Pi

The Court hereby finds that according to U.C.A. 76-1 -403 and Utah case law on the
issue, the mistrial declared in this matter on August 18,1998 was not an improper termination of
the prosecution and resulted because the jury was unable to agree upon a verdict The Court
further finds a proper record was made at the time the mistrial was declared and thus orders as
follows:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss be denied.

Dated this tfr^dav of February, 1

G. Rand Beacham
District Court Judge
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ADDENDUM E
Court of Appeals' Decision
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State of Utah,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Plaintiff and Appallea,
v.
Valdan Gram,

Case No. 99050S-CA
FILED
(December 21, 2000)

Defendant and Appellant.

2000 UT APP 375

Fifth District, St. George Department
The Honorable 0. Rand Beacham
Attorneys: Aaron J. Prisbrey, St. George, for Appellant
Jan Graham and Laura B. Dupaix, Salt Lake City, for
Appellee

Before Judges Jackson, Davis, and Thome.
THORNS, Judge:
Defendant Valdan Cram appeals from an order denying his
motion to dismiss a subsequent charge, following the trial
court's declaration of mistrial. We affirm.
Defendant argues that the trial court's denial of his motion
to dismiss violates the Fifth Amendment right against
being twice
put in jeopardy for the same criminal offense.1 We disagree.
Defendant's motion to dismiss followed the trial court's decision
to declare a mistrial after determining that the jury waa unable
to reach a verdict. Defendant made no objection to the trial
court'a decision to declare a mistrial.1 We have explained that
1. Defendant also argues that the trial court'a dismissal of his
motion violates Utah Const, art. I, S 12, but ha presents this
court no independent analysis of how the trial court'a ruling
violates the State constitutional provision, therefore, we do not
address this issue. Sfim Utah R. App. P. 24.
2. In fact, defendant waited until the scheduling conference for
the new trial to alert the court of his objection to the
(continued...)

"Utah courts require specific objections in order 'to bring all
claimed errors to the trial court's attention to give the court
an opportunity to correct the errors if appropriate.'" state v.
3X£wn, 356 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (emphasis added)
(citation omitted). This is particularly true where, as here,
the trial court could have resolved defendant's timely objection
before the jury was discharged.
"As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court
may not ba raised on appeal." state v. Holcata. 2000 UT 74,111,
10 P.3d 346 (citing State v. Marvin. 964 P.2d 313, 313 (Utah
1998)). The preservation rule, as it is known, "applies to every
claim, including constitutional aueationa.» ££*. (emphasis
added). Utah does, however, recognize three exceptions to the
preservation rule: (1) plain error, (2) exceptional
circumstances, and (3) ineffective assistance of counsel. See
State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5, 7 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
Defendant fails to argue any of these three exceptions to
the preservation rule. Rather, defendant acknowledges chat he
knew the court was contemplating a mistrial, but believed he was
not obligated to object. Defendant was in error. "[A] defendant
should not be permitted to forego making an objection with the
strategy of 'enhancCing] the defendant's chances of acquittal and
then, if that strategy fails, . . . claim[ing] on appeal that the
Court should reverse.'* Holaate. 2000 OT 74 at 111 (alterations
in original) (citation omitted). Accordingly, defendant has
failed to adequately preserve his objection.
Were we to address the merits of defendant's double jeopardy
claim, our ultimate conclusion would not change. The Utah
Supreme Court has explained that "[w]hen . . . the jury is unable
to reach a verdict, . . . a defendant may be retried
notwithstanding the double jeopardy clause.• state v. Muaaelman.
667 P.2d 1061, 106S (Utah 1983) (emphasis added) (citing Lea v.
United Statea. 432 U.S. 23, 97 S. Ct. 2141 (1977); State v.
Jaramillo. 25 Utah 2d 32S, 481 P.2d 394 (1971); State v. Gardner.
62 Utah 62, 217 P. 97« (1923); United Staeaa v. Scott. 437 U.S.
32, 98 S. Ct. 2187 (1980)); a^ alaa Utah Code Ann. S 76-1-403(4)
(1999) (codifying the protection against double jeopardy).
However, "Utah court* have interpreted the protection against
double jeopardy . . . to mean that upon the declaration of
mistrial, a defendant may not be retried on the same charge
unless a 'legal necessity1 justified termination of the trial."
Weae Valley City v. Patten. 1999 UT App 149,1l0, 931 P.2d 420
(citation omitted).
2. (...continued)
mistrial.

990506-CA

2

In Patten, we set forth the standards previously articulated
by our supreme court in State v. Ambrose, 598 p.2d 3S4 (Utah
1979), for determining whether "legal necessity" exists for
granting a mistrial. First, the "trial court must give an
explanation for its decision and discuss possible 'curative
alternatives to a mistrial.'" Patten. 1999 UT App 14 at 111
(citation omitted). "Second, the trial court must enter findings
of fact supporting its decision . . . ." idL Finally, the trial
court "may not declare a mistrial 'so abruptly . . . that
defendant's counsel haCs] no opportunity to object.'" id.
(alteration in original) (citation omitted).
In the present matter, the trial court, on two separate
occasions, inquired of the jury foreperson whether additional
deliberation time or the court answering additional questions
would facilitate a verdict. On both occasions, the jury
foreperson responded "no." We conclude that the trial court
discussed "'possible curative alternatives to a mistrial." id*,
(citation omitted).
The dialogue between the trial court and the jury
foreperson, the subsequent Minute Entry chronicling the time the
jury deliberated, the court's supplemental "deadlock" instruction
to the jury, and the time spent conferring with counsel--all
contained in the record--demonstrate that sufficient grounds
exist to support the trial court's declaration of mistrial, we
conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
declaring a mistrial.
Finally, the trial court clearly did "not declare a mistrial
'so abruptly . . . that defendant's counsel hatdj no opportunity
to object.'" H * (quoting *fhrfflll 598 P.2d at 360). The trial
court, on two separate occasions, asked defendant's counsel if he
would like to go oa record in response to the jury's inability to
reach a verdict or inquire of the jury foreperson. Defendant's
counsel declined oa both occasions. Accordingly, we are
convinced that the trial court complied with the standards set
forth in >"twHM «ad that a "'legal necessity' justified
termination of [defendant's] trial." Id*, at 1l0 (citation
omitted). That trial judge was properly exercising his discretion
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when he declared a mistrial. Double jeopardy does not bar
defendant's subsequent retrial and conviction.
Denial of defendant's motion to dismiss is affirmed.

Lliam A. Thorn*, Jr.,'Judg«
Will

WE CONCUR:

Normafe H. Jackson,,
AssociafiA^Prtsiding Judge
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